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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
In two separate cases, the State charged Mr. Davis with, respectively, felony
failure to notify of change of address for sexual offender registration, and multiple felony
sex offenses against minors. The jury in the first case found Mr. Davis guilty of failure to
notify of change of address for sexual offender registration. Later, the jury in the second
case found Mr. Davis guilty of two counts of lewd conduct with a child under sixteen,
two counts of sexual battery of a minor child sixteen or seventeen years of age, and one
count of possession of sexually exploitative materials.
On appeal, Mr. Davis asserts the district court committed reversible error when it
denied his motion for a mistrial in the second trial, because the State committed
prosecutorial misconduct by violating the district court’s order precluding the
introduction of evidence on Mr. Davis’ status as a registered sex offender. Mr. Davis
also asserts the district court abused its discretion when it imposed his sentence in the
first case, because the district court incorrectly considered certain aggravating factors
when fashioning the sentence.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
On September 6, 2013, Gale Jacobs reported a theft to the Payette Police
Department. (Presentence Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.5; Tr., Vol. 2, p.904, Ls.18-21.)1
Mr. Jacobs told Chief Clark that he had previously discovered about $5000 was missing
from a lockbox at his business. (PSI, p.5.) His grandson, Mr. Davis, was suspected in
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that theft, but no charges had been filed. (PSI, p.5.) Mr. Jacobs wished to report
another theft where $30,000 had been taken from his residence in Payette. (PSI, p.5.)
He suspected Mr. Davis was behind that theft. (PSI, p.5.) Mr. Jacobs also stated
Mr. Davis lived with seventeen-year-old twin boys, T.B. and Z.B., in Payette, and
suspected T.B. and Z.B. were involved in or had knowledge of the theft. (PSI, p.5.)
Mr. Davis and his mother subsequently went to the police station regarding the
burglary at Mr. Jacobs’ business. (PSI, p.5.) Mr. Davis told Chief Clark a seventeenyear-old boy, A.E., was the individual he believed had burglarized Mr. Jacobs’ business.
(PSI, pp.5-6.) Mr. Davis denied involvement in the reported thefts and agreed to take a
polygraph examination. (PSI, p.6.) Chief Clark would later testify that Mr. Davis told
him he was living at 160 7th Avenue North in Payette (hereinafter, the Payette address)
with T.B. and Z.B. (Tr., Vol. 1, p.163, L.9 – p.164, L.10.)
Mr. Davis participated in a polygraph examination, but the examination was
ended after Mr. Davis reportedly tried to beat the examination. (PSI, p.6.) After further
police questioning, Mr. Davis admitted to taking $1000 of Mr. Jacobs’ money from his
residence, but denied knowledge of the remaining $29,000. (PSI, p.6.) Mr. Davis was
later arrested on a warrant for grand theft and burglary. (PSI, p.6.)
Lieutenant Marshall with the Payette Police Department and Detective Gooch
with the Idaho State Police conducted interviews with T.B., Z.B., and Austin Breshears.2
(See PSI, p.6.) T.B., Z.B., and Mr. Breshears reported they had been paid by Mr. Davis

1

All citations to “Tr., Vol. 1” refer to the transcript for the trial held April 28, 29 and 30,
2015. All citations to “Tr., Vol. 2” refer to the transcript for the trial held August 18-21
and 25, 2015. All citations to other transcripts will include the date of the transcript.
2
Mr. Breshears reported during his interview that he was nineteen years old, and had
been eighteen years old when he met Mr. Davis. (PSI, p.64.)
2

in exchange for sexual favors, along with A.E. and another juvenile male, C.J.A.. (See
PSI, pp.6-8.)

T.B. spoke with Detective Gooch about his sexual relationship with

Mr. Davis, after Mr. Breshears had the officer leave the interview room so he could
discuss with T.B. “his need to cooperate.” (PSI, pp.7, 69.) Z.B. initially denied having a
sexual relationship with Mr. Davis, but after Mr. Breshears spoke with him, Z.B. reported
being paid by Mr. Davis for “sexual favors.” (PSI, p.7.)
The next day, search warrants were executed at the Payette address and at
1375 Anderson Corner Road in Parma (hereinafter, the Parma address), to locate
evidence related to sexual contact that may have taken place between Mr. Davis and
minor-aged males. (PSI, p.8.) Mr. Davis was a registered sex offender, and his sexual
offender registration showed his address as the Parma address. (PSI, p.9.) Several
electronic items were seized from the houses. (PSI, p.8.) About a month later, multiple
videos that appeared to show minor-aged males and females engaged in sexual
activities were found on a laptop seized from the Payette address. (See PSI, p.8.) The
males were identified as T.B. and Z.B., and the females were identified as C.G. and S.L.
(PSI, p.8.)

Another computer search found an image that reportedly showed T.B.

performing a sexual act on Mr. Davis. (PSI, p.8.)
In Payette County No. CR 2014-2145 (hereinafter, the registration case), the
State charged Mr. Davis by Information with one count of sexual offender registration –
failure to notify of change of address or name, felony, I.C. §§ 18-8304(1), 18-8309(1),
(2) and/or (3), and 18-8311(1), and a persistent violator sentencing enhancement
pursuant to I.C. § 19-2514. (R., pp.82-86.)
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In Payette County No. CR 2014-2249 (hereinafter, the sexual conduct case), the
State charged Mr. Davis by Indictment with four counts of lewd conduct with a child
under sixteen, felony, I.C. § 18-1508; four counts of sexual battery of a minor child
sixteen or seventeen years of age, felony, I.C. § 18-1508A; seven counts of possession
of sexually exploitative material for other than a commercial purpose, felony, I.C. §§ 181507 and 18-1507A; and a repeat sexual offender sentencing enhancement pursuant to
I.C. § 19-2520G. (R., pp.304-11.)
The registration case went to a jury trial first. (R., pp.221-36.) The records and
evidence custodian with the Payette County Sheriff’s Office testified Mr. Davis was a
registered sex offender, he had last registered with her in December 2012, and he had
registered at the Parma address. (See Tr., Vol. 1, p.117, Ls.1-9, p.119, Ls.3-7.)
T.B., Z.B., and the twins’ mother testified they and Mr. Davis had moved into the
Payette address in May 2013. (Tr., Vol. 1, p.229, Ls.2-12, p.292, Ls.16-22, p.368, L.8 –
p.369, L.9.) T.B. had met Mr. Davis through a Future Farmers of America (“FFA”)
workday held at Mr. Jacobs’ business. (See Tr., Vol. 1, p.288, L.23 – p.289, L.2.) The
twins’ mother testified Mr. Davis’ family had previously allowed her to live in a trailer at
the Parma address following her cancer treatment, and after she left the twins stayed at
the Parma address before they moved to the Payette address. (See Tr., Vol. 1, p.365,
Ls.3-10, p.367, Ls.5-24.) T.B., Z.B., and the twins’ mother testified Mr. Davis took the
middle bedroom at the Payette address and stayed there almost every night. (Tr., Vol.
1, p.240, L.25 – p.241, L.4, p.244, Ls.13-17, p.299, L.21 – p.301, L.6, p.389, L.14 –
p.390, L.9.) Mr. Davis moved out in September 2013. (Tr., Vol. 1, p.371, Ls.2-8.)
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Mr. Davis’ parents testified they lived at the Parma address. (Tr., Vol. 1, p.418,
Ls.4-17, p.440, Ls.18-24.) They stated Mr. Davis had an apartment above a woodshop
at the Parma address. (Tr., Vol. 1, p.420, L.19 – p.421, L.15, p.443, Ls.6-18.) The
parents testified that, after Mr. Davis moved some of his items from the apartment in
May of 2013, they would see him at home two to four nights a week. (Tr., Vol. 1, p.427,
L.17 – p.428, L.14 – p.446, L.20 – p.447, L.18.)
The jury found Mr. Davis guilty of failure to notify of change of address of sexual
offender registration. (R., p.267.) The district court then found Mr. Davis guilty of the
persistent violator sentencing enhancement.

(Tr., Vol. 1, p.534, Ls.18-22.)

Upon

Mr. Davis’ request, the district court set sentencing out for after the trial in the sexual
conduct case. (Tr., Vol. 1, p.537, Ls.1-21.)
In the sexual conduct case, Mr. Davis filed a Motion in Limine to Exclude Prior
Acts/Convictions. (R., pp.468-69.) The motion in limine requested an order precluding
the introduction of evidence relating to “the necessity for Jacob Davis to register as a
sex offender,” by the State or its witnesses. (R., p.468.) At the hearing on the motion,
the State told the district court, “[w]e did not anticipate presenting any of that.”
(Tr., May 29, 2015, p.12, Ls.21-22.) The district court “granted the motion in limine as
requested by the defense with the provision that the defense not open the door to that
line of questioning.” (R., p.470; see Tr., May 29, 2015, p.12, L.23 – p.13, L.4.)
The sexual conduct case then proceeded to a jury trial. (R., pp.545-551, 55663.) T.B. testified he and Z.B. had turned sixteen years old in May of 2013. (Tr., Vol. 2,
p.345, Ls.4-14.) T.B. started hanging out with Mr. Davis after C.J.A. introduced them at
the FFA workday in late 2012. (See Tr., Vol. 2, p.336, L.8 – p.338, L.7, p.340, Ls.5-8.)
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T.B. testified that, before he moved to North Dakota to live with his father in January of
2013, Mr. Davis tried to kiss him and offered to give him money in exchange for manualgenital contact. (See Tr., Vol. 2, p.353, L.18 – p.356, L.20.) He testified that after he
came back from North Dakota in April of 2013, he repeatedly engaged in sexual
conduct, including manual-genital, oral-genital and anal-genital contact, with Mr. Davis
in exchange for money. (See Tr., Vol. 2, p.356, L.25 – p.364, L.2, p.367, Ls.7-24.) He
testified the sexual conduct took place at both the Parma address and the Payette
address. (See Tr., Vol. 2, p.360, Ls.22-24, p.364, Ls.17-20.)
T.B. then testified he spoke with Detective Gooch. (See Tr., Vol. 2, p.369, Ls.120.) Mr. Breshears was also there “[t]o help trying to calm me down . . . .” (Tr., Vol. 2,
p.370, Ls.12-19.) T.B. testified that, after talking to Mr. Breshears, he told Detective
Gooch about the sexual conduct with Mr. Davis. (Tr., Vol. 2, p.372, Ls.1-7.) T.B. further
testified that, in a subsequent contact with Detective Gooch, she showed him a
photograph of him performing oral sex on Mr. Davis. (See Tr., Vol. 2, p.372, L.8 –
p.374, L.24.) He testified Detective Gooch also showed him a video of him having
sexual intercourse with C.G. (See Tr., Vol. 2, p.376, L.1 – p.377, L.5.) T.B. testified he
and C.G. had sexual intercourse in Mr. Davis’ bedroom at the Payette address. (See
Tr., Vol. 2, p.383, L.21 – p.385, L.17.) According to T.B., Mr. Davis had a laptop in the
middle bedroom. (Tr., Vol. 2, p.349, L.21 – p.350, L.10.)
On cross-examination, T.B. testified Mr. Davis had a camera in his bedroom,
“because he felt like my mom was sitting there searching through all of his stuff.”
(Tr., Vol. 2, p.430, Ls.13-19.) T.B. had been with Mr. Davis when he purchased the
camera, but did not know exactly where it had been installed. (Tr., Vol. 2, p.431, Ls.3-
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20.) T.B. did not know who activated the video when he was having sexual intercourse
with C.G. (Tr., Vol. 2, p.444, Ls.3-5.)
Z.B. testified that he had repeatedly engaged in sexual conduct with Mr. Davis in
exchange for money and other gifts. (See Tr., Vol. 2, p.654, Ls.3-25, p.656, L.19 –
p.657, L.10.) He testified he had manual-genital and oral-genital contact with Mr. Davis.
(See Tr., Vol. 2, p.655, L.20 – p.656, L.18.) Z.B. also testified Mr. Davis had a laptop in
the middle bedroom. (Tr., Vol. 2, p.658, Ls.3-19.) He testified that he and S.L. had
sexual intercourse in Mr. Davis’s room. (Tr., Vol. 2, p.663, L.17 – p.664, L.3.)
On his contacts with the Idaho State Police, Z.B. testified they wanted to ask
some questions about Mr. Davis. (Tr., Vol. 2, p.666, Ls.6-12.) The following exchange
then happened:
[State:]

So were all of those, or I guess the few times that you spoke
with Idaho State Police, was it always about [Mr. Davis]?

[Z.B.:]

Yes.

[State:]

Okay. And what? In what context?

[Z.B.:]

What do you mean?

[State:]

Like, what did they want to talk to you about [Mr. Davis]
about?

[Z.B.:]

About registered sex offender.

(Tr., Vol. 2, p.666, Ls.16-24.)
Mr. Davis objected and requested a mistrial. (Tr., Vol. 2, p.666, L.25 – p.667,
L.19.) His counsel asserted, “[s]o we have a specific ruling previous that we weren’t to
discuss anything about a prior conviction, and I think clearly that puts that in jeopardy. I
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think that’s opened the door. And I don’t know how you could strike that from their
memory, even if they were instructed.” (Tr., Vol. 2, p.667, Ls.13-18.)
In response, the State argued, “[t]he topic in and of itself, though somewhat
prejudicial, there wasn’t an exact address as to whether he was or was not, just the
topic in and of itself.” (Tr., Vol. 2, p.667, Ls.21-24.) According to the State, the jury did
not know exactly what was going on, the State would stay away from further
examination on the area, “[a]nd the facts that sex offender registration as a topic was
discussed, the connection is barely there.” (Tr., Vol. 2, p.667, L.25 – p.668, L.7.) The
State contended Z.B. “didn’t say whether or not [Mr. Davis] was a registered sex
offender, didn’t say whether he is a registered sex offender, he just said they asked him
about sex offender registration.” (Tr., Vol. 2, p.668, Ls.8-11.)
The district court stated it would take the motion under advisement. (Tr., Vol. 2,
p.668, Ls.12-14.) Mr. Davis asserted, “[i]t could be nobody else except [Mr. Davis]. I
mean, that’s who the prosecutor asked him about. What were they talking about?
About [Mr. Davis]. Registered sex offender. Boom.” (Tr., Vol. 2, p.668, Ls.18-21.) In
response, the State again argued, “[i]t wasn’t a registered sex offender. Sex offender
registration.” (Tr., Vol. 2, p.668, Ls.22-23.) The district court took the motion for a
mistrial under advisement. (Tr., Vol. 2, p.669, Ls.17-19.)
Z.B. subsequently testified that during his contact with the Idaho State Police,
they showed him a video depicting the sexual intercourse he had with S.L. (Tr., Vol. 2,
p.670, L.14 – p.671, L.21.)
T.B. and Z.B. testified Mr. Davis had chest tattoos with T.B.’s and Z.B’s first and
middle names and dates of birth. (Tr., Vol. 2, p.398, L.22 – p.399, L.13, see Tr., Vol. 2,
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p.674, Ls.9-22.) T.B. and Z.B. also testified they received letters from Mr. Davis in late
2013 stating: “Don’t take what you have for granted, because you will regret it in the
end.” (Tr., Vol. 2, p.675, L.15 – p.677, L.1; see Tr., Vol. 2, p.392, L.23, p.395, L.18.)
On cross-examination, Z.B. testified there was nothing unusual or different about
Mr. Davis’ penis. (See Tr., Vol. 2, p.682, Ls.1-16.) Mr. Davis later testified that he had
a penis piercing, and submitted into evidence photographs of his genitals taken during
the trial. (Tr., Vol. 2, p.900, L.10 – p.903, L.2.)
The Idaho State Police investigative assistant assigned to the matter testified that
she grabbed a laptop from the middle bedroom during the search of the Payette
address. (See Tr., Vol. 2, p.247, Ls.16-20.)

Chris DeLoria testified he was a criminal

investigator and computer forensic examiner predominantly assigned to computer
forensic examinations with the Internet Crimes Against Children task force. (Tr., Vol. 2,
p.519, Ls.11-24.) He testified Detective Gooch brought him a laptop. (Tr., Vol. 2,
p.527, L.19 – p.528, L.1.) Mr. DeLoria performed a forensics exam of the laptop. (See
Tr., Vol. 2, p.530, Ls.11-15.)

He testified the username on the laptop was “Jake.”

(Tr., Vol. 2, p.538, L.15 – p.539, L.6.) According to Mr. DeLoria, a photograph found in
the “Me” folder on the laptop looked like a younger version of the defendant. (Tr., Vol.
2, p.541, L.21 – p.542, L.8.) Mr. DeLoria testified there was also an “IP cam”3 folder on
the laptop that contained a “My Room” subfolder. (Tr., Vol. 2, p.558, L.17 – p.559, L.8.)
He testified that he found three or four videos in the My Room folder that appeared to
depict T.B. and Z.B. engaged in sexual contact with females. (See Tr., Vol. 2, p.579,
L.24 – p.597, L.17, p.603, Ls.3-5.)

3

Mr. DeLoria testified “IP” stood for “Internet Protocol.” (Tr., Vol. 2, p.558, Ls.22-23.)
9

Mr. Breshears testified for the defense that Mr. Davis gave him money to buy a
truck, and that he had lied to the police when he told them he and his mother had
bought it.

(Tr., Vol. 2, p.778, Ls.11-19.)

Mr. Breshears had performed cleaning

functions on Mr. Davis’ computer. (Tr., Vol. 2, p.786, Ls.13-17.) He also testified that
he had once remotely accessed Mr. Davis’ computer after Mr. Davis logged him in.
(See Tr., Vol. 2, p.801, Ls.15-19.)

According to Mr. Breshears, he wanted to talk to

T.B. during the police interview because he had a feeling that the twins “were not telling
the officers what they needed to know.” (Tr., Vol. 2, p.811, Ls.7-21.) Detective Marshall
testified that Mr. Breshears told him that he was good with computers. (Tr., Vol. 2,
p.846, Ls.4-9.)
After the close of evidence, the district court denied Mr. Davis’ motion for a
mistrial. (Tr., Vol. 2, p.921, Ls.6-21.) Mr. Davis declined a curative instruction, because
“it would just add more emphasis to it.” (Tr., Vol. 2, p.921, Ls.13-16.)
The jury found Mr. Davis guilty of two counts of lewd conduct, two counts of
sexual battery, and one count of possession of sexually exploitative materials, and
found him not guilty of the other counts.4 (R., pp.602-05; Tr., Vol. 2, p.980, L.11 –
p.981, L.2.) The district court found beyond a reasonable doubt that the State had met
its burden with regard to the repeat sexual offender sentencing enhancement. (See
Tr., Vol. 2, p.1000, L.23 – p.1001, L.1.)

The district court set sentencing for the

4

After the close of evidence, the State had moved to dismiss two of the possession of
sexually exploitative material counts and one of the sexual battery counts. (See
Tr., Vol. 2, p.916, Ls.1-7.) The district court then granted Mr. Davis’ motion to dismiss
one of the other possession of sexually exploitative material counts. (See Tr., Vol. 2,
p.916, Ls.8-18, p.919, Ls.5-14.)
10

registration case and the sexual conduct case for the same date. (Tr., Vol. 2, p.1001,
Ls.21-23.)
In the registration case, the district court imposed a unified sentence of forty-five
years, with twenty years fixed, to be served concurrently with the sentence imposed in
the sexual conduct case. (R., pp.290-92.) In the sexual conduct case, the district court
imposed a unified sentence of thirty-five years, with fifteen years fixed, for each of the
lewd conduct and sexual battery counts. (R., pp.628-30.) The district court imposed a
unified sentence of fifteen years fixed for the possession of sexually exploitative
material count. (R., p.629.) The sentences imposed in the sexual conduct case were to
be served consecutively. (R., p.629.)
Mr. Davis filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the Judgment and Commitment in
each case.

(R., pp.738-42.)

The Idaho Supreme Court consolidated the appeals.

(R., p.752.)5

5

Mr. Davis also filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (“Rule 35”) motion for a reduction of
sentence covering both cases. (R., pp.745-48.) The district court denied the Rule 35
motion. (Supp. R., pp.9-14.) Mr. Davis filed, pro se, a separate Notice of Appeal timely
from the denial of the Rule 35 motion in both cases. (Supp. R., pp.41-44.) Upon motion
of the State Appellate Public Defender, the Idaho Supreme Court consolidated those
appeals, Docket Nos. 44105 & 44106, with Mr. Davis’ other two appeals. (Supp.
R., pp.53-55.) At this time, Mr. Davis has decided not on raise any issues on appeal
related to the denial of the Rule 35 motion in both cases.
11

ISSUES
1.

Did the district court commit reversible error when it denied Mr. Davis’ motion for
a mistrial in the sexual conduct case?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of
forty-five years, with twenty years fixed, upon Mr. Davis following his conviction
for failure to notify of change of address for sexual offender registration?

12

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Committed Reversible Error When It Denied Mr. Davis’ Motion For A
Mistrial In The Sexual Conduct Case

A.

Introduction
Mr. Davis asserts the district court committed reversible error when it denied his

motion for a mistrial in the sexual conduct case. The State improperly elicited testimony
from Z.B. on Mr. Davis’ status as a registered sex offender. In doing so, the State
committed prosecutorial misconduct by violating the district court’s order granting
Mr. Davis’ motion in limine and thereby precluding the introduction of such evidence.
The State will not be able to meet its burden of showing beyond a reasonable doubt that
this prosecutorial misconduct is harmless. The prosecutorial misconduct’s continuing
impact on the trial indicates that the district court committed reversible error when it
denied Mr. Davis’ motion for a mistrial.

B.

Standard Of Review
Idaho Criminal Rule 29.1 provides that “[a] mistrial may be declared upon motion

of the defendant, when there occurs during the trial an error or legal defect in the
proceedings, or conduct inside or outside the courtroom, which is prejudicial to the
defendant and deprives the defendant of a fair trial.” I.C.R. 29.1(a). When there is a
motion

for

mistrial

based

upon

prosecutorial

misconduct

supported

by

a

contemporaneous objection to the underlying procedural or evidentiary error, an
appellate court reviews the denial of the motion for mistrial for reversible error. State v.
Field, 144 Idaho 559, 571 (2007).

13

[T]he question on appeal is not whether the trial judge reasonably
exercised his discretion in light of circumstances existing when the mistrial
motion was made. Rather, the question must be whether the event which
precipitated the motion for mistrial represented reversible error when
viewed in the context of the full record. Thus, where a motion for mistrial
has been denied in a criminal case, the ‘abuse of discretion’ standard is a
misnomer. The standard, more accurately stated, is one of reversible
error. Our focus is upon the continuing impact on the trial of the incident
that triggered the mistrial motion. The trial judge’s refusal to declare a
mistrial will be disturbed only if that incident, viewed retrospectively,
constituted reversible error.
Id. (quoting State v. Sandoval-Tena, 138 Idaho 908, 912 (2003)).
When there has been a contemporaneous objection, the appellate court
determines factually if there was prosecutorial misconduct, and then determines
whether the error was harmless. Id. The appellate court must keep in mind the realities
of trial when determining whether prosecutorial misconduct has occurred:
While our system of criminal justice is adversarial in nature, and the
prosecutor is expected to be diligent and leave no stone unturned, he is
nevertheless expected and required to be fair. However, in reviewing
allegations of prosecutorial misconduct we must keep in mind the realities
of trial. A fair trial is not necessarily a perfect trial.
Id. (quoting State v. Estes, 111 Idaho 423, 427-28 (1986)).

C.

The State Committed Prosecutorial Misconduct When It Elicited Testimony From
Z.B. On Mr. Davis’ Status As A Registered Sex Offender
Mr. Davis asserts the State committed prosecutorial misconduct when it elicited

testimony from Z.B. on Mr. Davis’ status as a registered sex offender, because the
State thereby violated the district court’s order granting Mr. Davis’ motion in limine and
precluding the introduction of such evidence.
As Idaho’s appellate courts have held, “[v]iolation of a district court order
governing the presentation of evidence may constitute misconduct.” State v. Erickson,
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148 Idaho 679, 684 (Ct. App. 2010) (citing Field, 144 Idaho at 572; State v. Martinez,
136 Idaho 521, 525 (Ct. App. 2001); State v. Agundis, 127 Idaho 587, 594-97 (Ct. App.
1995)). For example, in Field, the district court had previously expressed any testimony
regarding a prior investigation of the defendant might be excluded, and the State
therefore promised it would speak with the district court outside the presence of the jury
before referring to an investigation. Field, 144 Idaho at 572. The Idaho Supreme Court
in Field accordingly held the State’s questioning of a witness about the investigation
“before discussing it with the judge outside the presence of the jury was prosecutorial
misconduct.” Id.; see Martinez, 136 Idaho at 525 (holding “the prosecutor disregarded
the district court’s ruling and, therefore, engaged in impermissible prosecutorial
conduct”); Agundis, 127 Idaho at 597 (holding “the prosecutor effectively disregarded
the substance of the district court’s ruling and so crossed the line of permissible
conduct”).
Here, Mr. Davis’ motion in limine requested an order precluding the introduction
by the State or its witnesses of evidence relating to “the necessity for Jacob Davis to
register as a sex offender.” (R., p.468.) The district court “granted the motion in limine
as requested by the defense with the provision that the defense not open the door to
that line of questioning.” (R., p.470; see Tr., May 29, 2015, p.12, L.23 – p.13, L.4.)
However, during the trial in the sexual conduct case, the State elicited testimony
from Z.B. on Mr. Davis’ status as a registered sex offender. The State asked Z.B.,
“what did [the Idaho State Police] want to talk to you about [Mr. Davis] about?” (Tr., Vol.
2, p.666, Ls.21-23.) Z.B. then answered, “[a]bout registered sex offender.” (Tr., Vol. 2,
p.666, L.24.) The State elicited this testimony despite the district court’s order granting
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the motion in limine and thereby precluding the introduction of evidence of Mr. Davis’
status as a registered sex offender. (See Tr., May 29, 2015, p.12, L.22 – p.13, L.1.) By
violating that order, the State committed prosecutorial misconduct. See, e.g., Field, 144
Idaho at 572; Erickson, 148 Idaho at 684.

D.

The State Will Be Unable To Meet Its Burden Of Showing Beyond A Reasonable
Doubt The Prosecutorial Misconduct Is Harmless
“Where a defendant demonstrates that prosecutorial misconduct has occurred,

and such misconduct was followed by a contemporaneous objection by defense
counsel, such error shall be reviewed for harmless error in accordance with
[Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967)].”
(2010).

State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227

“Where the defendant meets his initial burden of showing that a violation

occurred, the State then has the burden of demonstrating to the appellate court beyond
a reasonable doubt that the constitutional violation did not contribute to the jury’s
verdict.” Id.
Here, the State will not be able to meet its burden of showing beyond a
reasonable doubt the prosecutorial misconduct did not contribute to the jury’s verdict.
The revelation of Mr. Davis’s status as a registered sex offender was highly prejudicial.
As Mr. Davis asserted in the motion in limine, the disclosure of his registration
requirement “would be far more prejudicial than probative for the jury and [is] unrelated
to the charges at issue herein.” (See R., p.469.) Disclosure to a jury of a defendant’s or
witness’s status as a registered sex offender has been recognized in other jurisdictions
as highly prejudicial. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 549 F.3d 963, 978 (5th Cir.
2008) (“[R]egistration as a sex offender is a ‘scarlet letter.’”); People v. Stefanovich, 136
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A.D.3d 1375, 1378 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016) (“[D]efendant derived no discernable benefit
from the jury knowing that he was a registered sex offender, and was highly prejudiced
thereby.”). Such information presents the significant danger the jury may improperly
discount the defendant’s theory of the case or the witness’s testimony “because of
personal revulsion for sex offenses.” See Jackson, 549 F.3d at 978. There is also the
risk a jury may improperly use the information as propensity evidence against the
defendant. See I.R.E. 404(b).
Indeed, in response to Mr. Davis’ motion for a mistrial, the State conceded the
topic was “somewhat prejudicial.”

(See Tr., Vol. 2, p.667, Ls.21-22.)

The State

attempted to deflect from this admitted prejudice by arguing “there wasn’t an exact
address as to whether [Mr. Davis] was or was not, just the topic in and of itself.” (See
Tr., Vol. 2, p.667, Ls.22-24.) Later, the State argued Z.B. “didn’t say whether or not
[Mr. Davis] was a registered sex offender, didn’t say whether he is a registered sex
offender, he just said they asked him about sex offender registration.” (Tr., Vol. 2,
p.668, Ls.8-11.) After the district court announced it would take the mistrial motion
under advisement, the State repeated that “[i]t wasn’t a registered sex offender. Sex
offender registration.” (Tr., Vol. 2, p.668, Ls.22-23.)
However, the record shows when the State asked Z.B., “what did they want to
talk to you about [Mr. Davis] about,” Z.B. answered, “[a]bout registered sex offender.”
(Tr., Vol. 2, p.666, Ls.22-24.) Z.B.’s response, contrary to the State’s argument before
the district court, was not about sex offender registration in a generic sense. Rather, his
response indicated the police had wanted to ask Z.B. questions about Mr. Davis being a
registered sex offender.

17

The jury was therefore likely to infer that Mr. Davis was a registered sex offender.
Cf. Erickson, 148 Idaho at 684 (“Although Erickson’s objection to the prosecutor’s
question was sustained, the question itself informed the jury that drugs were found in
Erickson’s vehicle. . . . The jury very likely would infer that the drugs belonged to
Erickson.”). In a case such as this one, involving allegations of multiple sex offenses
against minors, a jury would probably hold Mr. Davis’ registered sex offender status
against him. Mr. Davis was prejudiced by the prosecutorial misconduct here.
In sum, the revelation of Mr. Davis’ status as a registered sex offender was highly
prejudicial.

The State will not be able to meet its burden of showing beyond a

reasonable doubt the prosecutorial misconduct is harmless.

E.

The District Court Committed Reversible Error When It Denied Mr. Davis’ Motion
For A Mistrial
Mr. Davis asserts the district court committed reversible error when it denied his

motion for a mistrial, because of the prosecutorial misconduct’s continuing impact on
the trial.
As previously discussed, the question on appeal is “whether the event which
precipitated the motion for mistrial represented reversible error when viewed in the
context of the full record.” Field, 144 Idaho at 571. The appellate court’s focus “is upon
the continuing impact on the trial of the incident that triggered the mistrial motion. The
trial judge’s refusal to declare a mistrial will be disturbed only if that incident, viewed
retrospectively, constituted reversible error.” Id.
Here, the continuing impact of the prosecutorial misconduct suggests the district
court committed reversible error when it denied Mr. Davis’ motion for a mistrial. For the
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reasons discussed above in Section I.D., the prosecutorial misconduct was highly
prejudicial. Z.B.’s response on Mr. Davis’ status as a registered sex offender placed a
“scarlet letter” on him that remained through the rest of the trial. Cf. Jackson, 549 F.3d
at 978.

It would be difficult not to conclude the prosecutorial misconduct, where

Mr. Davis was on trial accused of multiple sex offenses against minors, had a continuing
impact across the trial.

Thus, the district court’s denial of Mr. Davis’ motion for a

mistrial, when viewed in the context of the full record, constituted reversible error. The
judgment of conviction in the sexual conduct case should be vacated, and the case
should be remanded to the district court for a new trial.

II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of FortyFive Years, With Twenty Years Fixed, Upon Mr. Davis Following His Conviction For
Failure To Notify Of Change Of Address Of Sexual Offender Registration
Mr. Davis asserts the district court abused its discretion when it imposed a
unified sentence of forty-five years, with twenty years fixed, upon him following his
conviction in the registration case.

The district court incorrectly considered certain

aggravating factors when fashioning the sentence in the registration case, where those
factors were based on the improper convictions from the sexual conduct case. The
sentence imposed in the registration case should be vacated and the case should be
remanded to the district court for resentencing.
Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively
harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record
giving “due regard to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the
protection of the public interest.” State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460 (2002).
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The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, “[w]here a sentence is within statutory
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of
the court imposing the sentence.” State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Mr. Davis does not assert that his sentence exceeds the
statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of discretion, Mr. Davis
must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence was excessive
considering any view of the facts. Id. The governing criteria or objectives of criminal
punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public
generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for
wrongdoing. Id. An appellate court, “[w]hen reviewing the length of a sentence . . .
consider[s] the defendant’s entire sentence.”

State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726

(2007). The reviewing court will “presume that the fixed portion of the sentence will be
the defendant’s probable term of confinement.” Id.
Mr. Davis submits the sentence imposed by the district court in the registration
case is excessive considering any view of the facts, because the district court
incorrectly considered certain aggravating factors when fashioning the sentence. The
district court conducted a combined sentencing hearing for both the registration case
and the sexual conduct case. (Tr., Nov. 6, 2015, p.5, Ls.15-21.) Among the factors the
district court discussed when it explained its sentencing decision, the district court
mentioned the jury in the sexual conduct case had found Mr. Davis guilty of five total
counts, rather than saying “you know what, we think he is guilty of one count, so we are
going to find him guilty of everything.” (See Tr., Nov. 6, 2015, p.37, L.20 – p.38, L.7.)
The district court stated the jury in the sexual conduct case had “considered, in my view
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carefully, whether the State had presented sufficient evidence beyond a reasonable
doubt, and they came up with those five counts.” (Tr., Nov. 6, 2015, p.38, Ls.8-11.)
The district court then told Mr. Davis it was “looking at a psychosexual evaluation
that indicates you are a high risk to very high risk to reoffend, that you are not amenable
to sex offender treatment . . . .” (Tr., Nov. 6, 2015, p.38, Ls.12-15.) The psychosexual
evaluation stated one of the primary reasons for its conclusion Mr. Davis was not
amenable to sex offender treatment was his “denying his sexual offense behavior.”
(PSI, p.174.) Mr. Davis had denied the allegations during the psychosexual evaluation.
(PSI, p.134.) The district court stated, “I see a complete lack of empathy, complete lack
of remorse, and I see before me a predator.” (Tr., Nov. 6, 2015, p.39, Ls.12-13.)
Mr. Davis submits the district court incorrectly considered the above aggravating
factors when fashioning the sentence, where those factors were based on the improper
convictions from the sexual conduct case. The district court expressly considered the
jury’s convictions from the sexual conduct case. (Tr., Nov. 6, 2015, p.37, L.20 – p.38,
L.12.) Right before it announced the sentences, the district court stated: “So based
upon the jury’s findings, I’m going to start with [the sexual conduct case].” (Tr., Nov. 6,
2015, p.39, Ls.17-18.) Additionally, the district court took into account Mr. Davis’ lack of
remorse, likely in the sense that Mr. Davis continued to deny the allegations, including
the ones for which he had been convicted. (See Tr., Nov. 6, 2015, p.39, Ls.12-13.)
However, as explained above in Section I, the district court actually committed
reversible error when it denied Mr. Davis’ motion for a mistrial in the sexual conduct
case. Thus, the convictions from the sexual conduct case were improper. The district
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court should not have fashioned its sentence for the registration case on the basis of the
improper convictions from the sexual conduct case.
Because the district court incorrectly considered certain aggravating factors
when fashioning Mr. Davis’ sentence in the registration case, the sentence imposed by
the district court is excessive considering any view of the facts. The sentence imposed
in the registration case should be vacated and the case should be remanded to the
district court for resentencing.

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Mr. Davis respectfully requests this Court vacate the
judgment of conviction in the sexual conduct case and remand the case to the district
court for a new trial.

Mr. Davis also respectfully requests this Court vacate the

sentence imposed in the registration case and remand the case to the district court for
further proceedings.
DATED this 23rd day of January, 2017.

__________/s/_______________
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Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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